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This paper explores the relationship between preferential and multilateral trade 
liberalization at the sectoral level using a unique dataset that includes data on most 
favored nation (MFN) and bilateral preferential tariffs at the 4-digit ISIC level for 11 Latin 
American countries over the period 1985–2005. We find evidence of heterogeneity 
across sectors. While in some industries, complementary effects between both kinds of 
trade liberalization are observed, in others no significant links are detected and—in a few 
cases—even substitutability seems to prevail. Variation across sectors appears to be 
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Latin America developed a complex web of simultaneous unilateral, multilateral, and 
preferential agreements as part of structural economic reforms implemented since the 
mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s (Ando and Estevadeordal, 2004). A natural policy 
question is how these trade policy reforms have interacted with each other. In particular, 
have preferential and multilateral trade liberalizations been complements or substitutes? 
A recent paper by Estevadeordal et al. (2008) shows that regional trade integration 
seems to have favored general trade liberalization. In other words, regionalism appears 
to have been a “building block” for multilateral trade liberalization in the case of Latin 
America.
1 In this paper, we explore whether the aforementioned result holds across 
sectors. More specifically, we investigate whether sectoral heterogeneity exists for 
changes in MFN tariffs in response to changes in preferential tariffs. In doing this, we 
exploit a new rich database, which substantially extends the database used in 
Estevadeordal et al. (2008). Our estimations suggest that the nature of the relationship 
between these two trade policy variables does indeed vary significantly across sectors. 
Furthermore, heterogeneity seems to be linked to specific country-sector characteristics 
such as import demand elasticities and revealed comparative advantages. 
 
We believe that these results based on the Latin American experience may provide 
valuable insights to other countries that have been less exposed to regionalism, but are 
increasingly involved in these kinds of initiatives. This is clearly the case of the Asian 
countries. Table A.1 in the Appendix presents the status of FTA (Free Trade Agreement) 
networking in extended East Asia as of March 2009.
2 This table reveals two interesting 
facts. First, the movement toward regional integration within Asia, through bilateral and 
plurilateral trade agreements, was lagging behind the rest of the world until recently. Until 
the mid-1990s, only one FTA had been signed: the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA). Even in this case, preferential tariffs were not 
significantly utilized in the 1990s. The utilization of preferential tariffs, or the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT), however, has recently been expanding at an 
explosive pace, as the case of Thailand shows in Figure 5. Furthermore, countries in the 
region have started to rapidly accelerate such movement since the 2000s, particularly 
the latter half of the 2000s, as many FTAs/PTAs (Preferential Trade Agreements) have 
been signed, put under negotiations, or at least been subject to feasible study and/or 
preparatory talks. Second, FTA networking in the region has been developed with 
ASEAN as its hub in terms of both bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements.
3 As of 
                                                           
1  See IADB (2009) for a recent map of overlapping preferential trade liberalization. 
2  Extended East Asia here includes the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)+6. “Plus six countries” are composed of the “plus three countries” (People’s Republic of 
China [PRC], Japan, and Korea) and India, Australia, and New Zealand. For some FTAs, their status 
in Table A.1 is based on the agreement of trade in goods; negotiations may still be ongoing over other 
areas such as investment and services, even if the agreements are identified as those signed or being 
effective. Besides the bilateral and plurilateral agreements identified in Table A.1, preliminary talks for 
ASEAN+3 FTA (EAFTA: East Asia Free Trade Area) and ASEAN+6 FTA (CEPEA: Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership in East Asia) have started. Furthermore, ASEAN’s membership has attempted 
to strengthen integration by signing the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) in 2008/2009 and 
proposing the establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) with a targeted year of 2015. 
3  Most of the plurilateral and bilateral agreements with ASEAN have introduced a system of rules of 2          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 39 
 
 
March 2009, all “plus six countries” had signed or enforced FTAs/PTAs with ASEAN as a 
whole, namely ASEAN+1 FTAs/PTAs,except India which has completed the 
corresponding negotiations. In addition to such plurilateral agreements, the “plus six 
countries”—particularly Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—have simultaneously made 
efforts to form bilateral FTAs with ASEAN countries (see Table A.2 in the Appendix for 
the case of Japan).
4  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes our dataset and presents descriptive evidence on the 
evolution and distribution of MFN and preferential tariffs in Latin America, and their 
relationship. Section 4 explains the empirical methodology, Section 5 reports the 
estimation results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Within and Between Trade Liberalization: What Do We 
Know? 
 
There is an extensive and controversial theoretical debate on how the formation of a 
regional trade agreement (RTA) influences the incentives of governments to set external 
tariffs, i.e., MFN tariffs. Few studies, however, have empirically examined the linkage 
between preferential and multilateral trade liberalizations, which is largely due to the 
difficulty in obtaining a comprehensive dataset of tariffs, especially in the case of 
preferential tariffs. This section reviews some empirical studies analyzing the relationship 
between these kinds of trade liberalization and discusses what we can learn from the 
existing literature. 
 
Using data on 51 industries for 1968–1983, Magee and Lee (2001) show that the 
enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) from 6 to 12 members in 
1967 induced members to reduce external tariffs over the following 15 years. Limao 
(2006) and Karacaovali and Limao (2008) analyze the impact of preferential trade 
liberalization on multilateral trade liberalization at the Uruguay Round in the United 
States (US) and European Union (EU), respectively. They find that liberalization was 
smaller in products where preferences were granted. More specifically, Limao (2006) 
finds that the US cuts in MFN tariffs were smaller for products imported under PTAs 
relative to similar products that the US imported only from non-members. The 
subsequent study by Karacaovali and Limao (2008) finds that the EU reduced its MFN 
tariffs on goods not imported under PTAs by almost twice as much as it did on PTA 
goods. The intuition on such a negative relationship between multilateral and preferential 
                                                                                                                                                                             
origin that allow a choice of either regional value content (RVC) or common change in tariff 
classification (CTC). The stronger points of plurilateral agreements would be that (i) the cumulative 
rules of origin in calculating RVC can be applied when RVC is selected and (ii) the common CTC can 
be applied when CTC is chosen, thereby, facilitating intra-regional trade. On the other hand, the 
stronger point of bilateral agreements would be the possibility to achieve higher degrees of 
liberalization in some sectors without enforcing consolidation at lower degrees of liberalization. 
4  Some preferential tariffs are lower in bilateral agreements than in plurilateral agreements. The 
opposite holds in other cases. It depends on the timing of enforcement, which influences the number 
of tariff reduction for phasing-out tariffs, and the baseline tariffs for preferential tariffs. See JETRO 
(2009b and 2009c) for the case of Japan and Malaysia–Indonesia–Thailand. Complements or Substitutes? Preferential and Multilateral Trade Liberalization at the Sectoral Level  |       3 
 
 
trade liberalization is that these large countries offer preferences on a unilateral basis to 
extract concessions from the recipients in nontrade areas, so they would tend to resist 
liberalization to prevent erosion of preferences. 
 
The studies referred to above concentrate on large and developed countries. Related 
papers focusing on developing countries include Baldwin and Seghezza (2007), and 
Estevadeordal et al. (2008).
5 Based on tariff-line data on the level of MFN and 
preferential tariffs for a large cross-section of developed and developing countries in 
2005, Baldwin and Seghezza (2007) find that these tariffs are complements, not 
substitutes, since margins of preferences tend to be low or zero for products where 
nations apply high MFN tariffs. They argue that the positive correlation between MFN 
and preferential tariffs might be caused by sectoral vested interests that (co-) determine 
both types of tariffs. Estevadeordal et al. (2008), on the other hand, analyze the 
relationship between changes in MFN tariffs and (lagged) changes in preferential tariffs 
using a rich dataset on tariffs at the 4-digit International Standard Industry Classification 
(ISIC) level (approximately 100 industries) over the period 1990–2001. They conclude 
that regional trade liberalization has had a complementary effect on general trade 
liberalization in the case of Latin American countries, particularly for those that are not 
members of customs unions.
6  
 
The question arises whether the above-mentioned overall pattern of the effects of 
preferential trade liberalization on multilateral trade liberalization uniformly prevails 
across sectors. Sectoral heterogeneity may appear for several reasons.
7 One possible 
rationale can be found in the model developed by Richardson (1993). In this model, 
external tariffs of a country joining an FTA should fall in industries in which imports have 
been diverted from the rest of the world to the FTA partner.
8 An alternative explanation is 
provided by Stoyanov (2009). He analyzes the effect of foreign lobbying on domestic 
trade policy when the country is a member of a preferential trade agreement using post-
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), industry-level trade data from Canada. 
He finds that the activity of foreign lobbyists is a significant determinant of trade policy. 
Sectors in which foreign firms without preferential market access are politically organized 
tend to receive less protection. Second, the heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also 
important. The presence of organized lobbying groups in an FTA partner country tends to 
raise trade barriers, while organized lobbying groups of exporters from outside of the 
FTA is associated with less protection. In sum, the existence of groups of foreign firms 
                                                           
5  See also Foroutan (1998) and Bohara et al. (2004). Foroutan (1998) examines trade and trade policy 
in over 50 developing countries and claims that integrating countries have been more active than non-
integrating countries in reducing multilateral trade barriers. Bohara et al. (2004) show that increased 
preferential imports vis-à-vis the domestic industry’s value added led to lower external tariffs in 
Argentina, especially in sectors that experienced trade diversion. 
6  In a related theoretical paper, Ornelas (2008) demonstrates that global free trade is unattainable even 
in a fully cooperative world if governments have political motivations, and in such an environment, 
RTAs can help move the world towards a welfare-superior equilibrium because members of RTAs also 
tend to reduce their MFN tariffs when they lower trade barriers against one another. 
7  Countries may decide whether to grant few preferences (i.e. lower preferential tariffs) taking the MFN 
as given, in which case no significant relationship between preferential and MFN would be observed 
(see Baldwin and Seghezza, 2007). 
8  See also Bohara et al. (2004). 4          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 39 
 
 
with varying lobbying capacities and the heterogeneity of these groups, depending on 
whether they are based in countries that are or are not members of the FTAs, may affect 
the relationship between multilateral trade liberalization and preferential trade 
liberalization at the sectoral level.
9  
 
In the next sections, we investigate whether there are sectoral differences in the 
response of MFN changes to preferential tariff changes and attempt to contribute to this 
literature by exploring what other factors may be driving these potential differences. 
 
 
3.  Data and Descriptive Evidence 
 
We have collected tariff data, both MFN and preferential, on a bilateral basis and 
disaggregated at the 4-digit ISIC Revision 2 level for 11 countries in Latin America 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela) over the period 1985–2005. This database substantially extends that 
used in Estevadeordal et al. (2008), which has similar information from 1990–2001. 
Importantly, it also covers the period 1985–1989. As we will see below, in this period, 
most sample countries implemented unilateral trade reforms and signed agreements that 
deepened regional trade integration and eventually led to more comprehensive 
arrangements such as MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. 
 
Table 1 reports moments of the distributions of the two key policy variables in our 
analysis: MFN and bilateral preferential tariffs. The figures suggest that trade 
liberalization in the region has been significant. Average and median (p50) MFN tariffs 
declined roughly 75% over the sample period, from approximately 40.0% in 1985 to 
around 10.0% in 2005. Expectedly, tariffs cuts were more pronounced within the region. 
On average, preferential tariffs diminished from about 40.0% to 5.0% when all countries 
were considered, and to less than 3.0% in the case of those nations that are members of 
customs unions. This can be clearly seen in Figures 1 and 2, which show the evolution 
of average MFN and preferential tariffs for all and each of the countries in the sample. In 
many countries, these tariffs experienced sharp declines between 1985 and 1990, which 
explains the relevance of including this sub-period in the study. Dispersion, as measured 
by the coefficient of variation (C.V. in Table 1), fell in the case of MFN tariffs but 
increased in the case of preferential tariffs. This primarily reflects asymmetric tariff 
treatments across partners in the region, depending on whether or not they are in the 
same main trading arrangement (e.g., MERCOSUR vs. Andean Community), as well as 
disparities in these treatments across sectors and within such arrangements. This is 
evident in Figure 3, which presents box plots of both MFN and bilateral preferential tariffs 
                                                           
9  Ando (2007) illustrates how foreign firms can influence a government’s decision-making process on 
setting MFN tariffs by looking at the experience of Mexico. The main reason why Mexican authorities 
reduced MFN tariffs unilaterally in 2004 and 2006 seems to be that they feared withdrawal of 
manufacturing multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Mexico. A considerable number of parts and 
components are imported from East Asian countries with which Mexico does not have trade 
agreements. On the other hand, many products are imported at lower imported prices with lower 
preferential tariffs under various trading arrangements in force. Given that, Mexico realized the 
importance of the urgent reduction of MFN tariffs in order to avoid withdrawal of MNEs from Mexico. In 
other words, the development of RTAs sometimes accelerates trade liberalization on a multilateral 
basis. Complements or Substitutes? Preferential and Multilateral Trade Liberalization at the Sectoral Level  |       5 
 
 
for 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. This figure confirms that enormous heterogeneity 
still exists in tariffs across countries, trading partners, and sectors. 
 
In Table 2, we explore the relationship between the two main variables in our 
econometric analysis. More specifically, we regress the change of MFN tariffs on the 
current and lagged changes of bilateral preferential tariffs and the change of preferential 
tariffs on the current and lagged changes of MFN tariffs, in both cases controlling for 
country, partner, sector, and year fixed effects. We find that there is a strong 
contemporaneous correlation between preferential tariff reduction and multilateral tariff 
reduction. Notice, however, that whereas lagged preferential tariff reductions positively 
and significantly predict MFN tariff reductions (Columns 2 and 3), lagged MFN tariff 
diminutions do not positively predict preferential tariffs diminutions (Columns 5 and 6). 
Further, simple correlations indicate that MFN tariff changes are more correlated with 
lagged preferential tariff changes (0.184) than with lagged MFN tariff changes (0.134), 
which suggests that MFN tariff cuts may be more influenced by past preferential tariff 
reductions than by past MFN tariff declines. In contrast, the reverse is not true. 
Preferential tariff diminutions are more correlated with past preferential tariff diminutions 
(0.111) than with past MFN diminutions (0.093). This evidence informally provides 
support to the hypothesis that multilateral and regional trade liberalizations are 
complements. In the next section, we describe the methodology that we use to formally 
investigate whether this is actually the case. 
 
 
4. Empirical  Methodology 
 
Our empirical approach is based on that proposed by Estevadeordal et al. (2008). We 
nevertheless deviate in two main aspects. First, instead of compressing the partner 
dimension by using the minimum preferential tariff, we consider all bilateral preferential 
tariffs. This enables us to estimate an “average relationship” between preferential and 
multilateral trade liberalizations across trading partners in the region. Second, we allow 
this relationship to vary across sectors by performing separate estimations for each           
4-digit sector identified in the ISIC Revision 2.  
 
Formally, our baseline estimation equations are: 
 
ijkt ijkt t k j i ijkt PREF MFN ε β γ γ γ γ + Δ + + + + = Δ −1        (1) 
ijkt ijkt ijt ijkt t k j i ijkt CUPREF CU PREF MFN ε δ ρ β γ γ γ γ . 1 + Δ + + Δ + + + + = Δ −            (2) 
 
where                             (by definition) represents the multilateral (MFN) tariff of country i 
in industry k in year t and                                       ;            denotes the preferential tariff 
of country i in industry k for goods coming from country j in year t and ;      is a binary               
0000000000000000000000000variable that takes the value of 1 if countries i and j are 
members of the same customs union in year t  and  0  otherwise;                         
000000000000000000000;               are country, partner, sector, and year fixed effects, 
respectively; and      is the error term.  
j MFN MFN ikt ijkt ∀ =
1 − − = Δ ikt ikt ikt MFN MFN MFN ijkt PREF
2 1 1 − − − − = Δ ijkt ijkt ijkt PREF PREF PREF
ijt CU
1 − Δ = Δ iijkt ijt ijkt PREF CU CUPREF t k j i γ γ γ γ , , ,
ijkt ε6          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 39 
 
 
If 0 〉 β , then countries reduce their MFN tariffs as they lower preferential tariffs. In this 
case, preferential trade liberalization would be a building block for multilateral trade 
liberalization. On the other hand, if 0 〈 β , then countries raise (or lower by less) their 
MFN tariffs as they lower preferential tariffs. In this case, regional trade liberalization 
would accordingly be a “stumbling block” for general trade liberalization.  
 
Admittedly, there might be shocks that affect the incentives of countries to liberalize or 
restrict trade both multilaterally and regionally. These shocks would then result in a 
positive correlation between            and,               thus acting as confounding factors. As 
discussed in Estevadeordal et al. (2008), if this were the case, we should not expect to 
observe systematic differences in the relationship between preferential and MFN tariffs 
in FTAs and customs unions. Hence, uncovering the existence of these differences 
would help confirm the identification of the effect of interest. This is precisely what we do 
in Equation (2). More precisely, if δ  is statistically significant, then there would be a 
differential impact of preferential liberalization on the incentives to liberalize vis-à-vis 
non-member countries in the customs unions, which would be evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that countries lower tariffs on outsiders because they are offering preferential 
treatment as opposed to the hypothesis that unobserved sector-specific shocks induce 
countries to liberalize or restrict trade generally. In short, this would be consistent with a 
theoretically-based causal relationship between both types of trade liberalizations.  
 
As discussed before, the relationship between multilateral and regional trade 
liberalizations is likely to be non-uniform across sectors. We therefore estimate it at the 



















i ijkt CUPREF CU PREF MFN ε δ ρ β γ γ γ . 1 + Δ + + Δ + + + = Δ −              (4) 
 
In the next section, we report the estimates of these equations and some variants aimed 
at checking the robustness of the results. 
 
 
5. Econometric  Results 
 
5.1 Aggregate  Estimates 
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Equations 
(1) and (2) pooling over sectors for the whole sample period, respectively. These 
estimates reveal that MFN tariffs decline following a reduction in preferential tariffs. In 
other words, multilateral and preferential trade liberalizations appear to be complements. 
Notice, however, that this does not seem to hold for countries which are members of 
CUs. In fact, in this case, MFN tariffs increase slightly in response to cuts in preferential 
tariffs. In Columns 3 and 4, we replicate the same estimations for the sample period 
used in Estevadeordal et al. (2008): 1990–2001. Notice that the estimated coefficients of 
interest are similar to those for the whole period, which informally suggests that potential 
structural breaks are not likely to be a major concern in our estimations. Further, we 
ikt MFN Δ 1 − Δ ijkt PREFComplements or Substitutes? Preferential and Multilateral Trade Liberalization at the Sectoral Level  |       7 
 
 
should mention that our estimates are smaller than those reported in Estevadeordal et 
al. (2008). A possible reason is that we are fully exploiting the partner dimension by 
using all observations instead of just taking the minimum. Thus, while we are computing 
in some sense an average effect, Estevadeordal et al.(2008) are more likely to be 
capturing the upper tail of the distribution of these effects.  
 
We next perform several robustness checks. First, we use an alternative specification of 
the fixed effects. More specifically, we include country–partner–sector fixed effects 
instead of country, partner, and sector fixed effects to account for all time-invariant 
factors that are specific to a sector for a particular country pair (Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4). Second, we re-estimate Equations (1) and (2), excluding the observations 
where the preference margin is too small to have an effect given the costs to comply with 
the rules of origin. In other words, if the margin of preference is too small, the costs 
involved in complying with these rules can be larger than the gains associated with the 
preferential treatment, which would be the equivalent of no preferences. We only keep 
those observations for which the preference margin exceeds 2.5 percentage points 
(Estevadeordal et al., 2008). Third, external tariffs can also be affected by preferential 
imports because they determine the extent of the terms-of-trade loss incurred by the 
preference-giving country vis-à-vis its partners. In order to control for the effects of 
preferential imports on the incentive to liberalize against outsiders, we include interaction 
terms of the share of imports from each partner in the sector with an indicator variable 
capturing the preferential margins. Import shares are inputted as observed in the initial 
period to avoid potential endogeneity problems. The preferential margin indicator, in a 
manner consistent with the criterion applied above, takes the value of one if this margin 
is above 2.5 percentage points and zero otherwise. The results of these exercises, which 
all confirm our main findings are reported in Table 4. 
 
Estimation results clearly indicate that preferential trade liberalization has led to 
multilateral trade liberalization, especially in the case of FTA members. The question 
then arises whether this holds for all sectors. If not, which sectors may be driving this 
result? We will address this issue in the next sub-section. 
 
5.2 Sectoral  Estimates 
 
We estimate the relationship between general and regional trade liberalizations for each 
sector identified in the 4-digit ISIC Revision 2. Estimates are presented in Figure 4. The 
left panel shows the estimated effect of lagged changes in bilateral preferential tariffs on 
MFN tariff changes for each of these sectors, whereas the right panel is a kernel density 
estimate of the distribution of these sectoral effects, both based on Equation (3). The 
figure reveals that there is important heterogeneity across sectors.  
 
In particular, even though preferential trade liberalization seems to have favored 
multilateral trade liberalization in many sectors, there are a relatively large number of 
sectors where no systematic association between these liberalizations is observed and 
there are even a few sectors for which substitutability effects are detected. The latter 
sectors include, among others, ocean and coastal fishing, crude petroleum and natural 
gas production, chemical and fertilizer mineral mining, grain mill products, manufacture 
of prepared animal feeds, fur dressing and dyeing industries, manufacture of containers 8          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 39 
 
 
and boxes of paper and paperboard, manufacture of fertilizers and pesticides, 
manufacture of drugs and medicines, and petroleum refineries. Many of these industries 
are heavy or raw material sectors, where market power may play a role. We explicitly 
assess whether this is the case by expanding Equations (1) and (2) to include country-
sector import demand elasticities and their interactions with those variables in the 
baseline estimation equation as additional covariates.
10 Estimation results are reported 
in Table 5. These results indicate that there is a stronger positive relationship between 
preferential and multilateral trade liberalizations for those sectors with larger import 
demand elasticities. This formally confirms that weaker complementarity and even 
substitutability are likely to be observed in sectors where less competitive conditions 
prevail. 
 
In addition, comparative advantage considerations may also contribute to explain the 
differences across sectors (and countries). Expectedly, countries are more likely to cut 
external tariffs once they have lowered regional tariffs in those sectors where they have 
an overall comparative advantage. We explore this possibility by including a measure of 
a country’s revealed comparative advantage in each sector in Equations (1) and (2), 
along with its interactions with the remaining variables, and estimating this modified 
version of the basic regression equations.
11 Estimates are presented in Table 6. These 
estimates clearly suggest that there is a complementarity effect between general and 
regional trade liberalizations and that this effect is stronger for those sectors where 




6. Concluding  Remarks 
 
Using a rich database, including both MFN and bilateral preferential tariffs for 11 Latin 
American countries over the period 1985–2005, we have analyzed the relationship 
between intra-regional and extra-regional trade liberalization going beyond the “average” 
or the aggregated level In particular, we have investigated whether there is 
heterogeneity in the response of MFN tariffs to changes in preferential tariffs at the 
sectoral level and found that, indeed, such heterogeneity is present. According to 
preliminary estimates, this heterogeneity is related to differences in import demand 
elasticities and revealed comparative advantages. 
 
We believe that these findings can provide helpful insights into trade policy design for 




                                                           
10  These elasticities have been taken from Broda et al. (2006). Unfortunately, we must drop observations 
corresponding to Paraguay as elasticities were not available for this country. 
11  Our measure of revealed comparative advantage is based on the indicator used by Proudman and 
Redding (2000). 
12  Similar results are obtained when using the value of the comparative advantage indicator in the first 
sample year to minimize endogeneity concerns. These results are available from the authors upon 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Year  Average    SD  CV  p10  p50  p90 
     All Countries 
MFN Tariff  1985  41.566  25.848 0.622 17.720 37.000 77.900 
   2005  11.399  6.718  0.589 5.000  10.000  18.940 
Preferential Tariff  1985  39.362  24.807 0.630 16.835 34.540 74.100 
   2005  5.448  5.133  0.942 0.570 4.130  11.920 
                                               Countries: Member of Customs Unions 
MFN Tariff  1985  45.395  27.585 0.608 17.050 40.830 83.750 
   2005  11.539  5.400  0.468 5.000  10.500  18.950 
Preferential Tariff  1985  43.064  26.454 0.614 16.130 38.470 78.620 
   2005  2.567  2.567  1.000 0.000 2.050 5.300 
CV = coefficient of variation, MFN = most favored nation, SD = standard deviation. 
Note: p10, p50, and p90 are the 10
th percentile, 50
th percentile, and 90
th percentile, respectively, of the 
distribution of the variables.The members of customs unions include countries that will be (1985) or are (2005) 
member of a customs union. 
Source: Authors’ preparation based on IDB-INT Tariff Database. 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation between MFN Changes and Preferential Tariff Changes  
 
∆MFN Tariff ∆Preferential Tariff  Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
∆Preferential Tariff  0.973***  0.965***         
   (0.007)  (0.008)         
∆Lagged Preferential Tariff    0.066***  0.064***       
     (0.003)  (0.004)      
∆MFN Tariff        0.845***  0.824***   
         (0.003)  (0.003)   
∆Lagged  MFN  Tariff       -0.023***  -0.004 
         (0.001)  (0.003) 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Partner  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  217560 206440 206440 217560 206440  206440 
R
2 0.848  0.836  0.184  0.850 0.836 0.197 
MFN = most-favored nation. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at the 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ preparation based on IDB-INT Tariff Database. 
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Table 3: The Relationship between MFN Tariff Changes and Preferential  
Tariff Changes 
 
Variable 1985-2005  1990-2001 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆Lagged Preferential Tariff  0.064*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.085*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Customs Union*∆Lagged  Preferential  Tariff   -0.076***  -0.097*** 
     (0.007)  (0.007) 
Customs  Union   0.453***  0.174*** 
     (0.031)  (0.021) 
∆Lagged Preferential Tariff + Customs 
Union*∆Lagged Preferential Tariff   -0.013***   -0.008** 
     [0.003]  [0.004] 
Country  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Partner  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Partner-Sector  Fixed  Effects      
Observations  206440 206440 108210 108210 
R
2  0.184 0.185 0.144 0.145 
MFN = most-favored nation. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at the 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ preparation based on IDB-INT Tariff Database. 
 
Table 4: The Relationship between MFN Tariff Changes and Preferential Tariff 
Changes  Robustness Check Exercises 
 
Fixed Effects Rules of Origin Import Shares Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Customs Union*∆Lagged Preferential Tariff    -0.073***
(0.007)    -0.076*** 
(0.007)    -0.078***
(0.006) 
Customs Union    0.922*** 
(0.073)    0.247*** 
(0.007)    0.307***
(0.030) 
Import Share 1985 * Lagged Preference 




Import Share 1985 * Lagged Preference 
Margin * Customs Union        0.252***
(0.078) 
∆Lagged Preferential Tariff+Customs 
Union*∆Lagged Preferential Tariff    -0.019***
[0.004]    -0.024*** 
(0.004)    -0.014***
(0.004) 
Country Fixed Effects      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Partner Fixed Effects      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Complements or Substitutes? Preferential and Multilateral Trade Liberalization at the Sectoral Level  |       13 
 
 
Fixed Effects Rules of Origin Import Shares Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Country-Partner-Sector Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes         
Observations  206440 206440 134487 134487 192520 192520 
R
2  0.196 0.197 0.199 0.200 0.187 0.188 
MFN = most-favored nation. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at the 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ preparation based on IDB-INT Tariff Database. 
 
Table 5: MFN Tariff Changes, Preferential Tariff Changes, and Import Demand 
Elasticities 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






























Demand Elasticity * ∆Lagged Preferential Tariff    0.000*** 
(0.000)    0.000** 
(0.000) 
Demand Elasticity * Customs Union * ∆Lagged Preferential 
Tariff      0.000 
(0.000) 
∆Lagged Preferential Tariff + Customs Union*∆Lagged 




∆Lagged Preferential Tariff + Demand Elasticity * ∆Lagged 
Preferential Tariff    0.065*** 
(0.000)    0.068**** 
(0.000) 
Country  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Partner  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  118180 118180 118180 118180 
R
2  0.206 0.206 0.207 0.207 
MFN = Most-favored nation. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at the 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ preparation based on IDB-INT Tariff Database. 14          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 39 
 
 
Table 6: MFN Tariff Changes, Preferential Tariff Changes, and Revealed  
Comparative Advantage 
 Contemporaneous 
Variable Revealed  Comparative  Advantage 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




























Revealed Comparative Advantage * ∆Lagged Preferential 
Tariff    0.030*** 
(0.003)    0.030*** 
(0.003) 
Revealed Comparative Advantage * Customs Union * 
∆Lagged Preferential Tariff      -0.025*** 
(0.004) 
∆Lagged Preferential Tariff + Customs Union*∆Lagged 




∆Lagged Preferential Tariff + Revealed Comparative 
Advantage * ∆Lagged Preferential Tariff    0.075*** 
(0.005)    0.078*** 
(0.005) 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Partner Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 183050  183050  183050  183050 
R
2 0.194  0.195  0.195  0.196 
MFN = most-favored nation. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at the 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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      Source: Authors’ preparation based on IDB-INT Tariff Database. 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the Average MFN (continuous line) and Preferential     
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Figure 4: Sectoral Estimates of the Relationship between MFN Tariff Changes and 











Note: The kernel density estimate is based on the Epanechnikov kernel. In the figure on the left, sectors are 
placed in increasing order of their ISIC codes. 
Source: Authors’ preparation based on IDB-INT Tariff Database. 
 











































AFTA = Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area, CEPT= common effective preferential tariff. 
Notes: Singapore is excluded for ASEAN as a whole since it has already removed tariffs on all but six items. The 
percentage shows the portion of exports. 
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Table A.2: Japan’s Free Trade Agreement Negotiations (As of Mar 2009) 
Counterpart  Negotiation started  Agreement signed  Entry into force 
Singapore  Jan 2001 Jan 2002 Nov 2002
Mexico  Nov 2002 Sep 2004 Apr 2005
Malaysia  Jan 2004 Dec 2005 Jul 2006
Chile  Feb 2006 Mar 2007 Sep 2007
Thailand  Feb 2004 Apr 2007 Nov 2007
Indonesia  Jul 2005 Aug 2007 Jul 2008
Brunei  Jun 2006 Jun 2007  Jul 2008
ASEAN  Apr 2005 Apr 2008 Dec 2008**
Philippines  Feb 2004 Sep 2006 Dec 2008
Viet Nam  Jan 2007 Dec 2008
Switzerland  May 2007 Feb 2009
GCC Sep  2006
India Jan  2007
Australia Apr  2007
(Korea)  Dec 2003 (Nov 2004 negotiation suspended) 
 
** Effective between Japan and Lao PDR, Myanmar, Singapore, and Viet Nam in Dec 2008; Brunei in Jan 2009; and 
Malaysia in Feb 2009. Other countries are expected to follow.  
GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council. 
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